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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

PRESTON SCOTT WALLACE,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 970552-CA
Priority No. 2

:
ARGUMENT

I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF THE
VICTIMS GANG AFFILIATION.
The State asserts that the trial court did not err in
excluding evidence of Joseph Quintana's ("Quintana" or "Victim")
gang affiliation.

See State's Brief ("S.B.") at 11-21.

The State

argues that evidence of Quintana's gang affiliation (police records
documenting Quintana's gang activity) is inadmissible under Utah
Rule of Evidence 403 (1998) for primarily two reasons:

1) the

evidence would be prejudicial, confusing and misleading because
"nothing suggested the murder was gang-related," S.B. at 11,16-19;
and 2) the evidence would be cumulative since similar evidence
about Quintana's gang affiliation was already before the jury. Id.
In focusing on these two reasons, the State loses sight of the
relevance of the evidence and misunderstands its admissibility
under Rule 4 03.
As an initial matter, the State is incorrect and the trial
court

erred

in

concluding

that

the

proposed

evidence

was

inadmissible under Rule 403 simply because the fight was not gangrelated.

In fact, Wallace does not assert that the evidence is

admissible on that basis.

Rather, the evidence is admissible because it goes directly to
Wallace's

"reasonabl[e] belie[f] that force

[was] necessary to

prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself."
§ 76-2-401(1) (1995) (Utah's self-defense statute).
Utah's

self-defense

consideration of
propensities,"

"the

statute

itself

expressly

Utah Code Ann.
To this end,
provides

for

[victim's] prior violent acts or violent

indicating

admissibility over exclusion.

the

legislature's

preference

U.C.A. § 76-2-402(5)(d).1

for

Evidence

1

The trial court referenced the word "may" in § 76-2402(5) with regard to the subcategories of information that a
court could consider in assessing a claim of self-defense, and
suggested that the use of "may" meant that consideration of such
information was optional.
A closer reading of the statute, however, suggests
otherwise. The statute actually states,
In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection
(1), the trier of fact may consider, but is not limited to,
any of the following factors: (a) the nature of the danger;
(b) the immediacy of the danger; (c) the probability that
the unlawful force would result in death or serious bodily
injury; (d) the other's prior violent acts or violent
propensities; and (e) any patterns of abuse or violence in
the parties' relationship.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (5) (a)-(d) . The phrase, "may consider,
but is not limited to" actually indicates that the jury should
have at least this information (where applicable), but more if
necessary.
The trial court's interpretation of "may" is more
restrictive than the context of the statute suggests. Further,
it exemplifies the error in excluding relevant evidence of
Wallace's self-defense claim where such evidence is contemplated
by the self-defense statute and is necessary for Wallace to
present a complete defense. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,
690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) (Constitution
guarantees each criminal defendant right to present a complete
and meaningful defense); Williams v. Lord, 996 F.2d 1481, 1483
(2d Cir. 1993) (restrictions on right to present complete defense
may not be "'arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they
are designed to serve'") (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44,
55-56, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987)).
2

of

Quintana's

gang

affiliation

is

just

such

evidence

and

establishes that Wallace was facing a dangerous person and, hence,
reasonably feared for his life and physical safety when he shot
Quintana during their altercation regardless of whether it was
gang-related.
The trial court nonetheless held, and the State reiterates in
its brief, that the proposed evidence was inadmissible because it
may have led the jury "'to base its decision on something other
than the established propositions of the case'" and was otherwise
duplicative of similar evidence going to Quintana's gang activity.
S.B. 16-18 (quoting State v. Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah
App. 1996)).

See also R.611-14 (trial court's ruling on exclusion

of evidence of Quintana's gang affiliation)
The risk of prejudice to Quintana and the cumulative nature of
the evidence perceived by both the trial court and the State is
overstated.

As to prejudice, the Utah Supreme Court in State v.

Danker, 599 P.2d 518 (Utah 1979), stated "if evidence is relevant
and competent, the mere fact that it may be inflammatory does not
render it inadmissible. . . . [The J]ury is entitled to know the
truth . . . to arrive at a just verdict."

Id. at 519.

The truth

of this situation is that Wallace faced an enraged gang member and,
although the fight itself was not gang-related, Quintana had a
propensity for violence.

The jury was entitled to know this

information in rendering its verdict in this case.

In fact,

without it, the jury was presented with an imbalanced view of the
events leading up to Quintana's death to the extent that prior bad
3

act evidence came in about Wallace.

See A.B. Point I.C., Point II.

Consequently, the jury was hindered in its ability to arrive at a
"just verdict."

Lindgren, 910 P.2d at 1272.

The proposed police reports are likewise not excluded simply
because other evidence touched on Quintana's gang affiliation.
noted

in Wallace's

opening

brief

("A.B.") at

Point

I.B,

As
the

proposed evidence was the only unbiased source of information of
its kind.

A.B. 15-16.

The other evidence that the State cites in

its cumulativeness argument came from biased sources and left large
gaps and credibility issues for the jury.

A.B. 16.

As the only unbiased source of this information, the police
records were not cumulative.

In fact, the reports were necessary

to resolve the confusion generated by the conflicting evidence
regarding the events leading up to the shooting.

See Utah R. Evid.

402 (1998) ("relevant evidence" is that which makes a consequential
fact more . . .

or less probable").

Moreover, while it is the jury's role to resolve evidentiary
gaps and credibility issues, it should not be deprived of unbiased
information that would make its fact-finding function easier simply
because

it

necessary.

could

do the

same

job without

the

information

if

Indeed, such would run counter to the primary objective

of a criminal trial:
the litigants".

"the search for truth . . . [and] justice to

Slusher v. Ospital by Ospital, 777 P.2d 437, 442

(Utah 1989); see also State v. Danker, 599 P.2d 518 (Utah 1979)
(judge must not exclude evidence if it assists jury in arriving at
a "just verdict").
4

For the
Wallace's

foregoing reasons and the argument

opening

brief,

the

trial

court

erred

set

forth in

in

excluding

evidence of Quintana's gang activity.2
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF WALLACE'S
PRIOR BAD ACTS.
A. Preservation Of The 404 (b) Issue Regarding Evidence Of
Wallace's Attempted Marijuana Buy.
As noted by the State, the 404(b) issue regarding evidence of
the marijuana buy was not preserved inasmuch as the court and
defense counsel discussed the admissibility of the evidence only in
terms of Rule 403.

S.B.24.

However, this Court may nonetheless

address the Rule 404(b) issue under the plain error doctrine.

The

plain error doctrine provides for appellate review where " (i) an
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and

(iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error,

there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for
[defendant]."

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993).

In the present case, an error exists, and the trial court
should

have

recognized

it, to the extent

that

challenge should have been made on the record.3

a Rule

404(b)

An attempted

marijuana buy is the quintessential "bad act" contemplated by Rule
404(b).

Hence, there is no reasonable rationale, strategic or

2

Wallace submits on his opening brief in response to other
assertions set forth in the State's brief, including the State's
harmless error argument. A.B. Point I.
3

As noted by the State, the record suggests there was an
off-the-record hearing regarding the matter wherein counsel
likely raised the Rule 404(b) issue. S.B.24 (citing R.170,51213) .
5

otherwise, for omitting a Rule 404(b) challenge, especially where
counsel clearly did raise a rule 403 objection.

R.512-14; see

State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) (plain error rule is
not implicated if defense counsel consciously and strategically
elects to not raise an objection)4.
Additionally, the error is harmful.

The force of the Rule

404(b) argument, combined with the inadmissibility argument under
Rule 403, likely would have compelled the trial court to exclude
such

evidence.

See

A.B.27-29;

infra

Point

II. B

(presenting

arguments that highlight the inadmissibility of the evidence under
Rule 404 (b)) .
In light of the foregoing, this Court may reach the Rule
404(b) issue under the plain error doctrine. However, in the event
that

this

Court

does not

do

inadmissible under Rule 403.

so, the evidence

is

nonetheless

See A.B. 29-31.

B. Evidence Of The Marijuana Buy Is Inadmissible Under Rule
404(b).
4

Given that defense counsel raised a Rule 403 objection,
it is apparent from the record that he did not make a strategic
and conscious decision to allow the evidence to come in.
Moreover, as noted supra note 3, defense counsel likely raised
the 404(b) issue at the hearing that occurred off the record. To
this extent, his failure to also raise a Rule 404(b) objection on
the record did not does not arise to ineffective assistance of
counsel. See State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 906 n.10 (Utah App.
1994); see State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah Ct. App.
1997) ("[i]n order to bring a successful ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, appellant must show that his trial counsel's
performance was deficient, in that 'it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness,' and that the deficient performance
prejudiced the outcome of the trial")(quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984)).

6

Assuming that this Court does address the Rule 4 04(b) issue
concerning the evidence of the attempted marijuana buy, Wallace
submits on his opening brief, see A.B.27-29, in addition to the
following points made in response to the State's brief.
The

State

asserts

that

Wallace

contested

the

State's

identification evidence at trial and, therefore, the evidence of
the marijuana buy was admissible under Rule 4 04(b) to establish
Wallace as the perpetrator.

S.B.26-27.

Specifically, the State

claims that Wallace's "strategy" to contest identity rendered the
marijuana buy evidence admissible.

S.B.26.

The State's reasoning is flawed for a number of reasons.
First, the State notes that Wallace put identity in issue since he
claimed

only

that

"wounded" him.

he

shot

S.B.26.

at Quintana, not

that

he

actually

Simply because Wallace contested the

allegation that he fatally wounded Quintana does not mean that he
contested

identity.5

Indeed,

in

admitting

that

he

shot

at

Quintana, Wallace conceded the identity issue. The State's failure
to distinguish between admitting identity while denying the actual

5

In fact, evidence supports Wallace's case that he did not
inflict the mortal wound: Adrianna Gonzalez reported hearing
shots around 9:00 p.m., then hearing Quintana in his apartment
yelling at someone in a white car around 10:00 p.m; although four
witnesses, Armando and Adrianna Gonzalez, Rudy Lopez and Dana
Miller, testified that they either saw or heard the fight and the
shots, no one called an ambulance and Quintana's body was not
found until the day after, R.434, 448-52, 541-43, 600, 626-34; no
gun was found and the bullet retrieved from the corpse could have
been fired from any one of over two hundred and fifty different
weapons, and not necessarily the .380 handgun that Wallace had
access to, R.643-44, 753[71] ; the casings found near the body,
although .3 80 caliber, did not bear Wallace's fingerprints.
R.436, 497, 499.
7

killing
baseless

mischaracterizes
rationale

for

the

defense

affirming

strategy

the

trial

and

court's

decision to admit such evidence under Rule 4 04(b).
additionally

asserts

that

the

evidence

was

provides

a

erroneous
The

necessary

State

for

the

prosecution to "strengthen" its case for identity since Wallace
repeatedly challenged Miller's identification testimony6.

S.B.27.

However,

out

context.

the

challenges

cited by

the

State

are

taken

of

Taken in their actual context, it is evident that they

would have had no bearing on the trial court's decision to admit
the marijuana buy evidence at that particular juncture in the
proceeding for purposes of identity under Rule 4 04(b).
As an initial matter, four of the six "repeated attacks," on
Miller's testimony cited by the State occurred prior to trial which
commenced July 15, 1997.
suppress

Miller's

See S.B.27 (citing R.24-43 - motion to

in-court

identification,

6/6/97;

R.134-35

-

amended motion to suppress Miller's identification, 6/25/97; R.17577, 188-89 - supplement to record on motion to suppress Miller's
identification, 7/14/97; 752 [97-99] - pretrial foundation objection
to Miller's identification of jacket worn by Wallace on night in
question, 4/29/97) . At this juncture in the proceeding, they were
6

The State similarly suggests that Wallace's reservation
of his opening statement also put identity in issue and justified
the trial court's decision to admit the evidence of the marijuana
buy. However, as discussed in his opening brief, A.B.28 n.7,
when the court ruled to admit the evidence, it already had ruled
that Miller could testify about her detailed account of the fight
and the shooting. R.752[74-79].
With Miller's key testimony
about Wallace, an identity defense was no longer viable. Hence,
the trial court's rationale for its ruling, and likewise the
State's rationale in its brief, e.g. "anticipat[ion]" of an
identity defense, R.513, is unfounded.
8

appropriate measures taken by defense counsel in his advocacy of
Wallace.

Moreover, they were all denied.

Consequently, they had

no bearing on the State's need of the marijuana buy evidence to
prove identity later on in the trial.
The two remaining challenges cited by the State consisted of
a mid-trial motion for a mistrial
motion

to

evidence.

dismiss

(R.746)

based

(R.607-08) and a post-trial
on

inadequate

identification

As with the other challenges, these challenges had no

bearing on the need for additional identification evidence because
both occurred a day or two after
evidence of the marijuana.

the court's admission of the

Moreover, such challenges were an

appropriate step for defense counsel to take in his advocacy of
Wallace.

Indeed, he would be remiss if he did not do so.

Given the timing of the challenges to Miller's identification
testimony, the State's position that they underscored the need for
additional
unfounded.

evidence

to establish

identity

is disingenuous

and

In essence, the additional evidence of the marijuana

buy only "strengthened" the State's case as the State itself admits
in its brief.
to establish

S.B. 27.

The evidence, however, was not necessary

identity and, therefore, not admissible

for that

purpose under Rule 4 04(b).
C. Access To A Gun Is Evidence Of "Other Crimes, Wrongs Or
Acts" And Thus Falls Within The Scope Of Rule 404(b).
The State asserts that Anthony Goad's testimony that he shared
a gun with Wallace and that Wallace was carrying that gun for
protection against unrelated gang threats, R.424-31, does not fall
within the scope of Rule 4 04(b) because such evidence "does not
9

involve a crime, wrong or act . . . [and] nothing

[] suggest[s]

that defendant's mere access to the weapon was anything but legal."
S.B.35.
Contrary to the State's naive perception of Wallace's "mere
access" to the gun, the evidence suggests that Wallace's carried
the gun for anything but "legal" and socially acceptable purposes.
As Goad testified, Wallace did not just have "mere access," S.B.35,
to the gun.

He actually carried the .38 caliber automatic two-to-

three times a week because his life had been threatened by someone
else.

R.426-29.

Moreover, at the time of this incident, Wallace

was about sixteen, a minor.
date of birth as 1/15/80).

R.5

(information listing Wallace's

Under Utah law, a minor in possession

of a firearm without the consent of his parent is guilty of at
least a class B misdemeanor.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-509 (1995)

(possession of dangerous weapon by minor).
Given

the

circumstances,

Wallace's

access

to

the

gun

qualifies, at minimum, as a wrong, if not a crime, falling properly
within the scope of Rule 404(b) . Indeed, its the very "badness" of
the act that prompted the prosecution to seek its admission in the
first place.

Accordingly, the State's assertion that Wallace's

"mere access" to the weapon was not a bad act is incredible and
unfounded in the record.7
D.
Evidence Of Wallace's Access To The Gun And Attempted
Marijuana Buy Is Inadmissible Under Rule 403.

7

The State does not address the admissibility of the
evidence of the gun under Rule 404(b). Hence, Wallace submits on
his opening brief. A.B.23-27.
10

The State asserts that the evidence of the attempted marijuana
buy and Wallace's access to a handgun is admissible despite Rule
403 proscriptions against evidence that is unduly prejudicial.
S.B.30-34,36-39.
The State initially challenges the "vitality" of the factors
set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d
291 (Utah 1988), which were addressed by Wallace in discussing the
inadmissibility of the evidence under Rule 403.

Id. at 295-96

(outlining factors for consideration in assessing admissibility of
prior bad act evidence under Rule 403). S.B.31.
As an initial matter, Shickles has not been overruled. Hence,
it has not been "abandoned" and is still "vital" for purposes of
this appeal. S.B.31.

Implicitly acknowledging the other authority

cited by the State, Wallace notes in his opening brief that the
Shickles

factors are advisory, not mandatory, when he states,

"[t]he admissibility of prior bad act evidence under Rule 403 takes
into account factors

such

as

. . . ."

A.B.30.

In so doing,

Wallace sets forth the Shickles factors as a helpful guide in
addressing this matter.8
III. WALLACE'S CLAIM OF ERROR IN THE DENIAL OF HIS MOTION HAS
RECORD SUPPORT.
The State claims that Wallace's argument regarding the denial
8

Wallace submits on his opening brief in response to the
State's argument that the evidence of Wallace's attempted drug
buy and his access to a handgun was admissible under Rule 403, as
well as the State's argument that admission did not constitute
reversible error. See A.B.29-32. Wallace's arguments under Rule
404(b), A.B. 23-29, further highlight how the evidence was not
probative of the issues in this case and, therefore, are unduly
prejudicial.
11

of his motion for a mistrial fails for lack of record support.
S.B.40-44.

The State's claim is without merit.

A. Wallace's Motion Was Ruled On And Is Therefore Properly
Before This Court.
The State initially asserts that this issue is not properly
before this court because the statement

challenged by Wallace

during his motion for a new trial was never ruled on at the
suppression hearing.

S.B.4 0-44. Assuming but not conceding that

Wallace did not properly challenge the statement at the suppression
hearing, the issue is still preserved for appeal to the extent that
the trial court ruled on the merits of Wallace's motion for a
mistrial.

In State v. Seale, 853 P.2d

862, cert. denied 126

L.Ed.2d 145 (1993), the Utah Supreme Court held that an appellate
review of a trial court's denial of a motion for a mistrial was
proper where the trial court "addressed the issue on the merits in
denying the motion" although the defendant had not raised the issue
prior to his motion.

Id. at 870. "Because the court considered the

alleged error rather than finding it waived, [defendant's] right to
assert the issue on appeal was resuscitated."

Id. (citing State v.

Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991), State v.Matsamas, 808
P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991).
In light of Seale, and to the extent that the trial court in
this case ruled on Wallace's motion for a mistrial, denying it on
the basis that Candland's statement was "not prejudicial" albeit
"non-responsive,"
without merit.

R.608, the State's preservation argument

is

Wallace's argument is therefore properly before

this Court.
12

B. Wallace's Claim Of A Miranda Violation Has Record Support.
The State additionally asserts that Wallace's claim of a
Miranda violation fails for lack of record support.

S.B.45-48.

Again, the State's argument is without merit.
In

the

first

place,

the

trial

court

itself

found

that

Detective Candland interrogated Wallace; that he was in cuffs and
therefore in custody; that Candland did not administer Miranda
warnings; and therefore ruled that Wallace's statements to Candland
were "suppressible."

R.753 [70].

bears out the trial court's ruling.

Moreover, Candland's testimony
Candland admitted that Wallace

was cuffed when she started questioning Wallace about a green
jacket

identified

assailant.

by

Miller

R. 753 [11].

She

as

the

also

one

worn

admitted

by

that

Quintana's
she

did

not

administer Miranda warnings before interrogating Wallace. Id. ; see
also

A.B.33-35

(discussing

record

support

for

custodial

interrogation).
In light of the above record support and contrary to the
State's unfounded assertion, there is more than enough information
in the record to support Wallace's claim of a Miranda violation.9
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing arguments and those set out in
Appellant's opening brief, Wallace respectfully requests this

9

Wallace submits on his brief in response to the remainder
of the State's argument regarding the trial court's erroneous
denial of the motion for a mistrial, including the State's
harmless error analysis. A.B.33-41.
13

Court to reverse the manslaughter conviction and remand for a new
trial.
ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant requests oral argument.
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